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I. INTRODUCTION
The best mode and duty of candor (inequitable conduct) requirements for obtaining United States patents serve laudable objectives but share common problems.
These full disclosure requirements are attractive from a policy
perspective. Who can argue against "truth in patents"? To obtain
valuable intellectual property rights in new technology, it is commonsensical that inventors and companies ought to be required to reveal to the public the preferred implementations of their inventions'
and should disclose to the patent granting agency (the Patent and
Trademark Office) information that is material to the patentability of
an invention. But the requirements have, in practice, greatly complicated the process of obtaining U.S. patents and injected substantial
uncertainty into patent enforcement.
A best mode or inequitable conduct violation results in the
sanction of nullity, the death sentence for a patent on an invention
that is otherwise a commercially valuable, novel, and nonobviousness
technological achievement. A violation provides a complete defense
1. This is not to say that there are no legitimate policy issues about the scope and depth
of the duty to disclose the technological details surrounding an invention for which a patent is
sought. Given that a patent is a "deal" between an inventor and society, the inventor giving
disclosure, society giving limited term intangible property rights, there remains the question of
how much disclosure is appropriate recompense for the rights. For example, suppose an inventor develops a whole new, complex medical diagnostic machine and seeks a patent claiming only a novel screen display feature of the machine. To require the inventor to disclose all
the details of the entire machine and all the processes used to make it, even though a patent is
only sought on a discrete part, would likely be considered by anyone to be bad policy. It
would cause inventors to forego seeking patents, with the attendant public disclosure costs, and
cause investors to channel their funds away from similar projects.
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to an infringement action, no matter how egregious the infringer's
conduct.
The requirements become "last resort" defenses for accused infingers who have weak technical defenses on infringement and patentability over the prior art. The courts impose heavy burdens of
proof on best mode and inequitable conduct challenges, but the ability to raise plausible best mode or inequitable conduct defenses is
made easier because the contours of the best mode and inequitable
requirements: (1) are not precise, (2) are subject to continuing judicial interpretation, and (3) depend on facts and states of mind at precise points of time, usually many years before the date of litigation.
Accused infringers may also prefer to rely on best mode or inequitable conduct violations because these defenses focus on human conduct and motivation rather than on complex technology and can thus
lend themselves to a "try the person rather than the patent" strategy.
Inequitable conduct is an attractive defense even to infringers who
have strong invalidity or noninfringement defenses; the substantive
defense may be sufficient to kill the patent, but a finding of inequitable conduct may enable an exonerated infringer to obtain a substantial award of attorney fees.
The best mode and inequitable conduct requirements are especially vexing for foreign inventors and companies who seek U.S. patents or face infringement charges for marketing products in the
United States. First, the standards are virtually unique to U.S. law.
Unlike other patent law standards, such as novelty and infringement,
best mode and inequitable conduct have no counterparts in the major
patent systems of Europe, Japan, and elsewhere. Second, determining compliance with the standards depends on information, including
the knowledge and intent of particular individuals at particular points
in time, that is not publicly accessible. Ordinarily, the information
comes to light, and becomes available as a means for attacking the
validity and enforceability of a patent, only as a result of the intrusive
discovery rules under U.S. litigation procedure.
This Article sets forth a general summary of the law on best
mode2 and inequitable conduct3 together with some recent (1996)
Federal Circuit case examples,4 which illustrate the impact of these
doctrines and the fine distinctions that the courts draw in applying
them. It concludes with a plea for "modest reform," that is, ways
2. See infra Part II.A. (summarizing best mode).

3. See infra Part III.A. (summarizing inequitable conduct).
4. See infra Parts II.B and III.B.
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short of a wholesale overhaul of the patent system that these requirements might be reformed to preserve the policies they serve but
reduce the uncertainty and expense that these doctrines impose on the
procedures for procuring and enforcing patents.
II.

BEST MODE REQUIREMENT

A. Summary
The specification of a patent must set forth the "best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. ' 5 The purpose of the best mode requirement is to prevent inventors from obtaining patent protection while concealing from the public preferred
embodiments of their inventions.6
Determining a best mode violation involves two factual inquiries. First, did the inventor have, at the time the patent application
was filed, a best mode of practicing the claimed invention? This is a
subjective inquiry, which focuses on whether the inventor in fact had
a preference. Second, did the specification adequately disclose the
inventor's best mode so that one of ordinary skill in the art could
practice the mode? This is an objective inquiry, which focuses on
what the specification discloses,
the scope of the claimed invention,
7
and the level of skill in the art.
1. Best Mode Distinguished from Enablement
A best mode violation can cause a patent claim to be invalid
even though the patent provides an enabling disclosure. For example, in one case, two patents on gas lasers, one on an improved laser
discharge tube with copper cups attached by "brazing" to a ceramic
tube's inside wall and one on a method of fabricating the tube with
cups, were held invalid because the patentee failed to set forth specific information on the preferred brazing method (TiCuSil, copper
silver eutectic with titanium-active metal brazing involves six
stages).8 The six stage brazing cycle was not disclosed in either the
5. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
6. In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
7. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1212 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus., 913 F.2d 923, 926 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
8. Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

[Clompliance with the best mode requirement focuses on a different matter than
does compliance with the enablement requirement. Enablement looks to placing the subject matter of the claims generally in the possession of the public. If,

however, the applicant develops specific instrumentalities or techniques which
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patent or the prior art. The patents met the enablement requirement
because they adequately disclosed an alternative brazing method.
2. Multiple Claims
If a patent contains multiple claims, the best mode analysis is

conducted on a claim-by-claim basis, and a violation as to one claim
9
will not necessarily invalidate other claims in the patent.

3.

Subjective Standard -Intent

to Conceal-

Inequitable Conduct
The "mode" that must be disclosed is not the best in fact but
rather the one believed to be best by the inventor. The fact that the

inventor (or his assignee) subsequently adopts a mode for commercial production that differs from that disclosed in the specification
does not necessarily mean that there has been a violation of the best
mode requirement.10
Some Federal Circuit decisions suggest that there must be evidence of the inventor's "intent to conceal" the best mode," but other
decisions reject such suggestions, holding that "[a] best mode viola-

tion may occur if the disclosure of the best mode is so objectively in12
adequate as to effectively conceal the best mode from the public."'

If a best mode violation is intentional, it can be deemed inequitable conduct, resulting in unenforceability of the entire patent and

other adverse consequences, such as an award of attorney fees against
3
the patent owner or the unenforceability of other related patents.
are recognized at the time of filing as the best way of carrying out the invention,
then the best mode requirement imposes an obligation to disclose that information to the public as well.

Id. at 1532.
9. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1209 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("Absent inequitable conduct, a best mode defense only affects those claims covering subject
matter the practice of which has not been disclosed in compliance with the best mode requirement.").
10. Texas Instruments Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 871 F.2d 1054, 1061
(Fed. Cir. 1989); Benger Lab., Ltd. v. R.K. Laros Co., 209 F. Supp. 639, 644-45,
(E.D. Pa. 1962), aft'd, 317 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1963).
11. E.g., Engel Indus. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384-85 (Fed. Cir. 1986):
Because not complying with the best mode requirement amounts to concealing
the preferred mode contemplated by the applicant at the time of filing, in order
to find that the best mode requirement is not satisfied, it must be shown that the
applicant knew of and concealed a better mode than he disclosed.
12. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1215 (Fed. Cir.
1996). Accord Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 789-90 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
13. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 807-15 (Fed. Cir.
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4. Assignee and Inventor-Non-U.S. Applicants
The best mode statute refers to the best mode contemplated by
"the inventor." Often, in patent law, when the human inventor assigns patent rights -

usually to his or her employer -

the assignee

is deemed to assume the inventor's obligations. However, the Glaxo
decision applied the best mode requirement literally, finding no violation when the inventor's assignee preferred a specific process for
converting the patented compound into a pharmaceutical composition
but the actual inventor had no knowledge of the process. 4 The majority noted that there would be no violation even if the assignee had
deliberately "walled off" the inventor. A dissenting judge argued that
"if there truly was.., a pattern of deliberate concealment of information that would otherwise have been known to the inventor, the
knowledge of those who sought to conceal that information and who
now attempt to enforce the patent may be imputed to the inventor."' 5
The Glaxo holding saved a patent covering an extremely valuable pharmaceutical product, but the close vote and the circumstances
suggest that a corporate assignee would not be well advised to deliberately conceal a preferred mode by keeping the human inventor ignorant of the facts and omitting the mode from the patent specification.
Glaxo illustrates the difficulties that non-U.S. inventors and
companies face in pursuing U.S. patents. The intricate best mode
disclosure requirement is unique to the United States, but, to establish
a right of priority in the United States, an applicant filing an application in another country must fully comply with U.S. disclosure requirements, including the best mode requirement. This means that an
applicant who intends to pursue patent rights in the United States
must, before filing a priority application in his or her own country,
predict, what must be disclosed to comply with the U.S. best mode
requirement. In Glaxo, the assignee initially filed in Great Britain
and deliberately omitted reference to the preferred process for converting the compound into a pharmaceutical composition based on its
patent officer's prediction that the U.S. best mode requirement would
not require disclosure of the process so long as the application contained only claims to the compound and not to compositions or thera1990) (related patents are unenforceable because of the patentee's inequitable conduct consisting of the substitution in one patent's specification of a fictitious, inoperable mode for the
patentee's contemplated best mode).
14. Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

15. Id. at 1056 (Mayer, J., dissenting).

1997]BESTMODECONCEAIMENT& INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 283
peutic methods.1 6 This advice may or may not have been accurate,
but, years later, the patent escaped a best mode violation for a different reason (no personal knowledge7 by the inventor), which the assignee most likely did not foresee.'
5. Time Frame - Continuation Applications
The critical time period for determining compliance with the
best mode requirement is the application filing date. 8 An inventor
need not amend an application to add a best mode discovered after
the filing date. If an inventor files an application promptly after
preparation, he will avoid the risk that a specific better mode will be
developed at some point after the preparation of an application but
before filing.
An inventor may discover a new best mode between the filing of
one application and the filing of a subsequent application that relies
for priority on the filing date of the previous application. 19 In
Transco, the Federal Circuit held that an applicant need not "update"
the best mode disclosure when filing a continuation application that
contains no new matter and that "the date for evaluating a best mode
disclosure in a continuing application is the date of the earlier application with respect to common subject matter." 0 The court cited
earlier case authority that "in the context of a priority claim under 35
U.S.C. § 119, one looks to the foreign application and its filing date
to determine the adequacy of the best mode disclosure and not to the
filing date of the corresponding U.S. application."'
6. Disclosure Adequacy- Trade Secrets
If the inventor contemplates a best mode on the filing date, the
specification must contain a description of that mode sufficient to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to practice the preferred
mode.22

16. Id. at 1046.
17. Id. at 1052.
18. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Riverton Lab., Inc., 433 F.2d 1034, 1038 (2d Cir. 1970).
19. One situation would be the filing of an application in another country and a filing in
the United States within one year. Another situation would be the filing of one application in
the United States and the later filing of a continuation or continuation-in-part application.

20. Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 557 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
21. Id.at 558.
22. Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("Even
though there may be a general reference to the best mode, the quality of the disclosure may be
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If the inventor prefers a specific material or process for use with
the invention, the specification must disclose it; it is not sufficient
that the material or process is known in the prior art or is commer-

cially available.' On the other hand, if the inventor does disclose the
best mode in some fashion, the state of the prior art must be considered in determining whether the disclosure is adequate. 24

To be adequate, a best mode disclosure need not necessarily enable the public to duplicate exactly the patentee's preferred implementation of the invention. 5 For example, in Amgen, the patent
claimed cells transformed with DNA to encode production of
erythropoietin (EPO). The inventor's best mode of practicing the
claimed invention was a specific Chinese hamster ovary (CHO) cell
line, developed with a technique -

gene amplification -

that multi-

plied the cells' copies of the gene and, therefore, their ability to produce EPO. In his patent specification, the inventor identified the
CHO cell line and the method of making it but did not deposit the
preferred cell line with a public depository. The court found no best

mode violation even though, without access to the inventor's cell
line, one could not exactly duplicate it. "What is required is an adequate disclosure of the best mode, not a guarantee that every aspect
of the specification be precisely and universally reproducible. 2 6
so poor as to effectively result in concealment.').
23. Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 940 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (a
patent required use of a magnetic tape cassette and stated that cassettes that "are almost universally available for audio purposes" were suitable; before filing the application, the inventor
purchased special cassettes that had better strength and magnetic characteristics than standard
tapes; the assignee argued that cassettes of the specified quality were commercially available
when the patent application was filed; "If so, it is this tape (or [the assignee's] own specifications) that had to be disclosed to satisfy the best mode requirement."; "While [the assignee's]
argument may be relevant to enablement, it does not establish the best mode 'contemplated by
the inventor,' which is a subjective inquiry."); Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd. Partnership, 860 F.2d
415, 418-19 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
24. Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus., 913 F.2d 923, 927 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See also Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585, 589-90 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (a patent that claimed a
portable computer disk cleaning apparatus and disclosed by trade name (not formula) the patentee's proprietary brand of cleaning fluid for use with the apparatus indiscriminately with
other less satisfactory cleaning fluids satisfied the best mode requirement because: (i) the patent described the brand as a "non-residue detergent solution," (ii) commercial substitutes were
readily available, and (iii) the accused infringer easily "reverse engineered" the patentee's
cleaning fluid).
25. See, e.g., Fonar Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1805 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (stating the functions of the best mode software satisfies the description test and do
not need to give actual source code of software); In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 816-17
(C.C.P.A. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981) (no need to set forth a known computer
program suitable for carrying out a claimed process if a skilled programmer could readily prepare such a program).
26. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See also
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That an inventor's preferred material comes from an outsider
supplier who claims trade secret rights in the material does not ex-

cuse the inventor from disclosing the material. 27 If an inventor does
not know a preferred material's composition or method of manufac-

ture, he must, at a minimum "provide supplier/trade name informa'
tion in order to satisfy the best mode requirement."28

7. Claimed Invention -Production Specifications
The "best mode" concerns the invention as defined by the patent's claims. Neither the statute nor the case law defines precisely

the relationship between the mode and the claimed invention. 29 The
best mode requirement includes not only a preferred embodiment or

example of the claimed invention but also unclaimed but preferred

materials and processes for making an embodiment. 30 The extent to

which the requirement includes contemplated uses of the invention is
not clear.3 '
Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
27. Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus., 913 F.2d 923, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("Whatever the
scope of [the supplier's] asserted trade secret, to the extent it includes information known by
[the inventor] that he considered part of his preferred mode, section 112 requires that he divulge it."; "Whether characterizable as 'manufacturing data,' 'customer requirements,' or even
'trade secrets,' information necessary to practice the best mode simply must be disclosed.").
28. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1214 (Fed. Cir.
1996). Compare Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 562 (Fed.
Cir. 1994):
The district court has imposed on [the patentee] not only the burden of establishing that a skilled artisan would have understood what was needed to practice
the best mode, but also the burden of establishing that the skilled artisan could
actually have replicated or obtained the material needed to practice the best
mode. Although there may be factual scenarios in which the latter burden
would be reasonable, caution should be exercised in imposing such a burden.
Otherwise, such a burden ultimately evolves into a per se rule that supplier/trade
name information must be disclosed or that an application become a production
specification, a result clearly contrary to law.
29. Wahl Instruments v. Aevious, Inc., 950 F.2d 1575, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("The
words in the statute are not without ambiguity. This case illustrates that the term 'mode' and
the phrase 'carrying out the invention' are not definable with precision.").
30. Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus., 913 F.2d 923, 928 (Fed. Cir. 1990):
[M]ost of the cases in which we have said that the best mode requirement was
violated addressed situations where an inventor failed to disclose non-claimed
elements that were nevertheless necessary to practice the best mode of carrying
out the claimed invention. See, e.g., Dana, 860 F.2d at 419 (failure to disclose
unclaimed fluoride surface treatment that was necessary for satisfactory performance of claimed seal violated best mode); Spectra-Physics, 827 F.2d at
1536 (failure to disclose specific braze cycle constituting preferred means of
attachment violated best mode even though no particular attachment means
claimed).
31. In Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1049-50 (Fed. Cir. 1995), the ma-
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An inventor need not disclose processes or materials that are

preferred not because they make the invention technically superior
but rather for commercial manufacturing convenience or for accommodating the needs of a particular supplier or customer. 2 An inven-

tor is not required to supply "production" specifications.

33

B. Recent Case Examples
Two 1996 Federal Circuit decisions addressed the best mode requirement, one affirming a summary judgment that a patent was invalid, the other rejecting a best mode challenge. Both cases involved
the fine line between "inventive preferences," which must be disclosed, and "commercial implementation," which need not be.
In United States Gypsum v. National Gypsum,34 the patent concerned joint compounds, which are adhesives used to fill joints be-

tween gypsum wallboards. The inventor, Williams, an employee of
the patentee, USG, conceived of using, as a filler in joint compounds,
silicone-treated expanded perlite, which is pulverized, heat-expanded,
porous lightweight volcanic ore treated with silicone to make it water
insensitive. Williams experimented with Sil-32, supplied by Silbrico
Corp., but found it unsatisfactory. Later, Silbrico sent Williams a
sample of Sil-42. Williams did not know Sil-42's exact chemical
composition, which Silbrico considered "proprietary," but discovered
that it had size and other advantages. Because 99% of its particles
were 100 mesh in size or smaller, it need not be screened before use
in a joint compound. It "eliminated the coarse look of other lightjority noted but did not decide the issue whether, for patent claims to a compound, the inventor
must disclose a preferred method for converting the compound into a pharmaceutical composition. Judge Mayer, dissenting, noted: "Mhe statutory language demands that the patent disclose the best mode of 'carrying out' the claimed invention ....T]his language encompasses
not only modes of making the invention, but of using it as well." Id. at 1053 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
32. See, e.g., Wahl Instruments v. Acvious, Inc., 950 F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (a
nondisclosed manufacturing process was "no more than a routine manufacturing choice selected because of expected volume of production and for reasons of cost" and "was, therefore,
not a 'mode' of 'carrying out' the invention within the meaning of the statute."; the inventor
selected a specific material for his commercial embodiment because it was cheaper for commercial production than the material disclosed in the patent; material selection for this type of
process was within routine knowledge); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d
1544, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds,486 U.S. 800 (1988) (the patentee, in
obtaining patents on various rifle parts, did not violate the best mode requirement by not providing production information sufficient to enable anyone to make parts interchangeable with
military procurement specifications for M-16 rifles; the best mode requirement "has nothing to
do with mass production or with sales to customers having particular requirements.").
33. See Wahl, 950 F.2d at 1580.
34. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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weight fillers, resisted breakdown under vacuum treatment, and
yielded a joint compound that was lightweight, easy to sand, and exhibited good non-cracking and adhesion properties."35 USG decided
to sell joint compound using Sil-42 perlite and to file a patent application.
Williams sent to USG's patent attorney formulations, all of
which listed Sil-42 as a component. A USG executive instructed the
attorney "to omit from the application any reference to Sil-42 or Silbrico Corporation. Subsequently, when the application was filed .... ,
it did not refer to Sil-42 either by chemical formula, method of manufacture, trade name, or supplier."36
In USG's infringement suit against National Gypsum, the district court granted National's motion for summary judgment that the
patent's claims were invalid because the inventor preferred Sil-42 on
the filing date and the specification did not inform those skilled in the
art how to make or otherwise obtain Sil-42.
The Federal Circuit affirmed, distinguishing prior decisions
which suggested an inventor need not always identify preferred suppliers or sources.37 First, the omitted information was a best mode,

not a commercial preference. The inventor's "selection of Sil-42
perlite was not 'a routine manufacturing choice' made 'because of
expected volume of production' or 'reasons of cost."' 38 The inventor
"selected Sil-42 perlite because it did not require screening and because it significantly improved the physical properties of the joint
39
compound, not just because it was available in large quantities.
"In short, [the inventor] believed that Sil-42 perlite was essential to
improving the invention; the material was not selected as a matter of
commercial expediency."4
Second, there was inadequate disclosure of the best mode. If an
inventor does not know a preferred material's composition or method
of manufacture, he must, at a minimum "provide supplier/trade name
information in order to satisfy the best mode requirement."' 4' The
specification defined "perlite as a rock that 'generally contains
65-75% SiO2, 10-20% A10,3, 2-5% -IO, and smaller amounts of
35.

Id. at 1211.

36. Id.
37.
38.

See text accompanying supra, note 24.
UnitedStates Gypsum, 74 F.3d at 1213.

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1214 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
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soda, potash, and lime,"' 42 but "that is not a description of Sil-42 silicone-treated expanded perlite, which consists of a proprietary blend
of perlite ores coated with an unknown silicone compound. '43 That
Sil-42 was another party's trade secret "does not excuse compliance
with the best mode requirement."' The patentee "contends, nonetheless, that those of ordinary skill in the art would have known how
to obtain 100 mesh silicone-treated expanded perlite because Sil-42
perlite was commercially available," but "[t]he evidence indicates... that the material was not well-known in the art in December
1982 [when the patent application was filed]. '45 A patentee "cannot
cure its failure to disclose the best mode of practicing the invention at
the time the application was filed by later selling a commercial product embodying the invention." 46 "More fundamentally, even though
Sil-42 perlite was sold commercially, the [patent's] specification
does not disclose it and, at the time.., the application was filed, no
one in the art except Williams and USG knew that Sil-42 perlite
should be used in a joint compound."47
In Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp.,48 the "mode" in question was
clearly preferred and was not adequately disclosed, but the court
found no best mode violation because the "mode" concerned only "a
particular embodiment, a commercial mode for a particular type of
use of the claimed invention. '49 The patent concerned a interferometer. Before filing its application, the patentee made "a commercial embodiment which encased the interferometer in a box" 50 for
which "it was necessary to add an illumination mirror and a spherical
' The patent's specification only disclosed the interferfield lens."51
ometer "without any enclosure together with the add-ons thereby
made necessary."52 The court candidly noted that "The phrases 'best
mode' and 'carrying out the invention' are not statutorily defined.
What is a 'mode' of the 'invention'? What acts or ideas are meant to
be encompassed by the phrase 'carrying out the invention'? These
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

46. 74 F.3d at 1215.

47. Id.
48. Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
49. Id. at 1567.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1565.
52. Id.
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questions are not answered by a mechanical rule.1 53 The best mode
requirement does not focus on "what a particular user decides to
make and sell or even in what field the invention is most likely to
find success. Rather, in keeping with the statutory mandate, our
precedent is clear that the parameters of a section 112 inquiry are set
by the claims."'54
Here, the claimed invention is an interferometer system which has
a number of applications. The inventors disclosed the mode for
carrying out that claimed invention: a light source, beam splitters,
various optical elements, a diffuse screen with a reticle, a camera,
and a monitor arranged in a particular manner.... [T]he disclosure is adequate to enable one of skill in this art to practice the invention of the claims .... [I]nterferometers can function and are
used commercially without an enclosure. The only argument is
that the hardware added to make Zygo's enclosed commercial embodiment should have also been disclosed. That argument must be
rejected. Because the claims simply do not require packaging of
any sort, the failure to disclose the enclosure is not a violation of
section 112.
With respect to the subject matter of the claims, an enclosed mode
may or may not be "best" for a particular commercialization. But
it is clear that an enclosure is not a necessary part of this invention
and there is no evidence that either inventor considered an enclosed interferometer to be the best mode of carrying out the invention.55
In Minco Inc. v. Combustion Engineering, Inc.,56 the Federal
Circuit reiterated the subjective portion of the best mode requirement
in that the inventor's intent controls when making a determination of
compliance with the best mode requirement. The Federal Circuit relied on Transco7 in stating that to invalidate a patent for a best mode
violation, an accused infringer must show by clear and convincing
evidence that the inventor "both knew of and concealed a better mode
of carrying out the claimed invention than was set forth in the specification. '5 8 In Minco, the claims at issue were directed to a crane
support on the housing and detachable extension of a rotary furnace
used to produce fused silica used in semiconductor technology. At
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Id.
Id. at 1567-68.
Minco Inc. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Id. at 560.
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issue was whether Minco's crane support configuration was a production decision as opposed to a "best mode" or superior method of
operation. Minco opted to use a new two crane support system because it had added more wheels to its drive system. The court applied the standard of one with ordinary skill in the art in finding that
the number of drive wheels varies according to the type of mineral in
the furnace and wheels were added to facilitate different minerals. In
adding wheels, to facilitate different minerals, Minco could not locate
a crane support as disclosed in the drawings of the patent application.
The Federal Circuit upheld on appeal that the evidence showed that
Minco did not appreciate that the mode at issue was better than the
mode which was disclosed at the time of filing. As such, no best
mode violation was found.
In Great Northern Corp. v. Henry Molded Products,59 the Federal Circuit held a patent which disclosed a structure for protectively
supporting and spacing rolls of web material in a multi-layer stack
invalid for failure to disclose the best mode. Great Northern is the
assignee of a patent which encompasses elongated bars of expanded
foam material with multiple recesses which may be used to support
rolls of material such as cellophane or steel. Great Northern initially
marketed the ROLLGUARD product embodying the patented invention, and later developed an improved version, ROLLGUARD II,
which had a molded pump roll support. Henry Molded Products also
developed a molded pump roll support called the STAKKER and received a patent thereon. Great Northern filed suit against Henry
Molded for patent infringement alleging the STAKKER infringed its
earlier filed patent. Henry Molded counterclaimed alleging Great
Northern's ROLLGUARD II infringed the STAKKER patent. In the
district court trial for patent infringement, a jury found that Henry
Molded's STAKKER product did not infringe and that claim 1 of the
Henry Molded patent which encompassed the STAKKER was invalid
for a best mode violation. More specifically, Great Northern charged
that Henry Molded did not disclose the use of diamond-shaped indentations (or ribs) which provide strength to the molded pulp of the
claimed roll support, and, this amounted to a failure to disclose the
best mode known to them at the time of filing.
In previous decisions, the Federal Circuit has distinguished the
best mode of practicing the invention from "production details."6
Commercial considerations such as equipment on hand, or prior rela59. Great Northern Corp. v. Henry Molded Prods., 94 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
60. Id. at 1572.
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tionships with suppliers which were satisfactory 61 have not been held
to constitute a best mode because they "do not relate to the quality or
nature of the invention." 62 The term "production details" has been
used by the court to refer to details which "do relate to the quality or
nature of the invention (and may therefore be a best mode) but which
63
need not be disclosed because they are routine."

Henry Molded argued that because the diamonds were added
during production, they were merely a production detail as opposed
to a best mode. Contrary to such contentions, the record clarified that
at a minimum the STAKKER products designed to support largediameter rolls could not be produced without the diamonds demonstrating that they were critical to practicing the invention rather than
simply a commercial consideration. The Federal Circuit also dismissed Henry Molded's argument that "those of ordinary skill would
have known to employ such diamonds even without explicitly being
told to do so." The argument was raised for the first time on appeal,
leading the Federal Circuit to hold that "we can only conclude that
Henry Molded chose not to litigate this issue at trial and therefore
waived it. "4

In Applied MaterialsInc. v. Advanced SemiconductorMaterials
America,61 in an unusual voting pattern, a majority of a three-judge
panel of the Federal Circuit held that claims in a patent issuing on a
continuation-in-part application (CIP) were not entitled to the benefit
of a parent application's filing date. Therefore, the claims were invalid because of a public use and sale occurring more than one year
before the CIP filing date. However, the two judges in the majority
relied on different disclosure violations. Chief Judge Archer found
an enablement or written description failure, and Judge Mayer found
a best mode failure. Judge Mayer reasoned that the parent application:
may have enabled one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the
claimed process ...[but] only the ... continuation-in-part disclosed the advantages of the... process and specifically claimed it
as the invention. In the interval, the inventors had developed [an
apparatus] that would optimize the advantages of this feature. To
61. See, e.g., Wahl Instruments v. Acvious, Inc., 950 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1991) and
Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
62. GreatNorthern Corp., 94 F.3d at 1572.

63. Id. at 1569, 1572.
64. Id. at 1573.
65.

Applied Materials Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., 98 F.3d 1563

(Fed. Cir. 1996).
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allow them to take advantage of the [parent application's] 1969
filing date almost 7 years later, add new matter to their application,
and not require them to disclose the best mode of the newly
claimed invention is a gross distortion of the bargain between the
inventor and the public.6
Judge Mayer distinguished Transco.
[A] continuation application, which was at issue in Transco, is
fundamentally different from a continuation-in-part, which is at issue here ....

Transco held that "an application is entitled to the benefit of the
filing date of an earlier application as to common subject matter... Applied to the best mode requirement, this narrow statement means that an applicant is not required to update the best
mode disclosure for continuation applications, which, of course,
add no new matter, or for inventions claimed in continuation-in-part applications that are otherwise entitled to the filing
date of a parent application because they meet all requirements
necessary to gain the benefit of the earlier filing date. However,
Transco's general discussion of "continuing" applications should
not be thought to apply the same requirements to both types of
"continuing" applications without considering the important differences between them. Both continuations and continuations-in-part may be referred to as "continuing" applications
for
67
some purposes, but they are different in important respects.
Dissenting, Judge Newman decried the new burdens that the
majority judges' separate theories would impose on patent applicants.
[T]his court in Transco explained that when the claims are entitled
to the filing date of the parent application, they do not lose that
entitlement when carried forward in a refiled application, whether
that application is a Rule 60 "continuation" or a continua-

66. 98 F.3d at 1581. Judge Mayer argued that:
If an inventor may file a patent application disclosing only part of an invention,
and then file a continuation-in-part adding substantial new matter without disclosing the best mode of what was newly added, the public will be deprived of
the full invention claimed in the continuation-in-part application. It would behoove inventors to disclose only minimal parts of their inventions, and then
submit continuations-in-part to claim the rest. They could thereby hide the
commercial value that resides in the best mode of practicing their inventions
and gain the benefit of both the exclusionary right of the patent and the "quasitrade secret" of the best mode.
67. 98 F.3d at 1579.
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tion-in-part....
However, when claims in the continuation-in-part require the
newly added matter for enablement the best mode is measured as
of the filing date governing those claims ....

It appears that the district court had been persuaded that [the applicant-patentee] was required to include all subsequently developed
aspects of its commercial apparatus, whether or not they were part
of the invention claimed in the... patent. That is not the law ....
Prior to the uncertainties now raised by my concurring colleagues,
each of whom imposes a different new obligation upon patent applicants, the law was that when the original specification is enabling, the best mode as to claims enabled by the original subject
matter is measured as of the original filing date. When an application is refiled with newly added matter, the initial matter does not
thereby lose its effective date, and claims that were initially enabled, and a specification that initially met the best mode requirement, do not lose their validity as to the common subject matter.68

III. DUTY OF CANDOR - INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
A. Summary
Patent applicants have a duty to disclose to the PTO information
of which they are aware that is material to the examination and to refrain from making misrepresentations or falsifying facts.69 Violation
of this duty of candor is referred to as inequitable conduct.
1. Materiality
The duty of disclosure extends to information and prior art that
is material. The duty of disclosure may arise with respect to:
(1) public use and on sale activity by the inventor and his as70
signee that may constitute a statutory bar;
68. 98 F.3d at 1582.
69.

37 C.F.R. § 1.56. The oath or declaration submitted with a patent application must

contain an acknowledgment of the duty of disclosure.
70. See. e.g., Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182,
Cir. 1993); LaBounty Mfg,. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066,
Cir. 1992); Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 759 F.2d 10, 14 (Fed.
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903. Cf. Reactive Metals & Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769
1583 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

1192 (Fed.
1074 (Fed.
Cir. 1985),
F.2d 1578,
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(2) prior art references of which the examiner may not be aware
that are more pertinent than those considered by the examiner; 7'
72
(3) testing and other data submitted in support of patentability;

and
(4) affidavits establishing a pre-filing date of invention. 73
A false statement that may influence an examiner's decision to
grant a petition to make special (i.e., expedite examination) is material even if it does not relate directly to the issue of patentability over
the prior art. In General Electro Music, the court held that a patent
applicant's attorney's statement that he had conducted a "prior art
search" was both material and intentionally false.74 "By filing a petition to make special, [the patentee] ...requested special treatment

and induced reliance on its statement that a prior art search had been
conducted. [It] cannot now argue that that statement was immaterial. 75
a. ReasonableExaminer Standard
From 1977 to 1992, the PTO rule on the duty of disclosure, Rule
56, provided that "information is material where there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in
deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent.

'76

71. See, e.g., Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1184-85 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Cf.B.F. Goodrich
Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys., 72 F.3d 1577, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
72. Rohm & Hass Co. v. Crystal Chem.Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1983),
laterproceeding, 736 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Cf.Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d
1043, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1995). An affidavit offering test data constitutes representation by the
applicant that the showing is a fair and accurate representation of the closest prior art of which
he is aware. Norton v. Curtis, 433 F.2d 779, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
73. Timely Prod. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.1975).
74. General Electro Music Corp. v. Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
75. 19F.3dat1411.
76. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977-1992). Before 1977, Rule 56 referred only to "striking" applications in connection with which any "fraud" was practiced. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1976). The
1977 amendment stated a positive duty to disclose material information. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56
(1977).
In assessing the conduct of patent attorneys and inventors in prosecutions before 1977,
court decisions differ on whether the 1977 Rule 56 change merely codified the existing duty of
full disclosure or represented a significant change in practice.
Compare Fox Indus. v. Structural Preservation Sys., 922 F.2d 801 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(rejecting argument that "Rule 56 does not govern.., duty of candor because the rule was
promulgated after his involvement with the applications ceased. . . ." "In 1977, the PTO clarified that Rule 56 merely 'codifle[d] the existing Office policy on fraud and inequitable conduct,
which is believed consistent with the prevailing case law in the federal courts."') with In re
Harita, 847 F.2d 801 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (1977 change "inaugurated a whole new way of life in the
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Court decisions adopted the important-to-a-reasonable-examiner
standard in applying the inequitable conduct defense." Under this
standard, an item can be material even though the item does not, on
objective evaluation of all the evidence, render the applicant's claims
unpatentable. 71 An item is not material if it is cumulative to information already cited to or considered by the PTO examiner. 79 Mere
arguments about the legal significance of references or other materi-

als in the record are unlikely to be considered material misrepresentations because the examiner is free to reach his or her own conclu-

sions about their significance."
A reference not cited during the original prosecution may be
brought to the PTO's attention in a reexamination, reissue, or con-

tinuation application. The examiner's action treating the reference as
relevant or not relevant will carry weight in a later judicial determination of materiality, but the action is not conclusive.81
prosecution of patent applications.").
77. Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("PTO Rule 56 is the appropriate starting point in determining the threshold level of materiality. This broad standard most closely delineates how an applicant ought to conduct business
with the PTO." (citation omitted)).
78. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 873 F.2d 1418, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(the patent in suit is unenforceable for having been inequitably procured because the applicant
withheld and misrepresented prior art and information even though that prior art and information did not render any of the claims of the patent invalid under the nonobviousness patentability requirement; "That the claimed invention may have been superior in one property to
both the cited and withheld prior art may be a basis for patentability; it cannot serve automatically to render the withheld prior art either cumulative or immaterial.").
79. Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("a patentee has no obligation to disclose an otherwise material reference if the reference is
cumulative or less material than those already before the examiner.").
Cf Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (uncited reference
showed a combination of features and individual features not shown in the references before
the examiner); LaBounty Mfg. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1076
(Fed. Cir. 1992); Gardco Mfg. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(undisclosed prior art devices were not cumulative to those the PTO considered because the
former were "the only prior art devices having all four of the structural elements of the claimed
invention.").
80. Akzo N.V.v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Cf.KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc. v. Caldor, Inc., 778 F.2d 1571, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (a
groundless assertion of entitlement to a prior application's filing date may be inequitable conduct if done knowingly or with gross negligence; an applicant is not excused by an examiner's
failure to make an entitlement determination).
81. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("We have held
that the result of a PTO proceeding that assesses patentability in light of information not originally disclosed can be of strong probative value in determining whether the undisclosed information was material. See J.P.Stevens (citation omitted) (reasonable rejection of claims in reliance on a reference during reissue proceeding established materiality of that reference).
However, the standard to be applied in determining whether a reference is 'material' is not
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b. Materiality:PrimaFacie Unpatentability

In 1992, the PTO, responding to criticism of the reasonable examiner standard as vague and bearing no relation to any concept applied in other areas of patent law, changed the standard to one of
"prima facie unpatentability":
[Iluformation is material to patentability when it is not cumulative
to information already of record or being made of record in the
application, and
(1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with other information, aprimafaciecase of unpatentability of a claim; or
(2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes
in:
(i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the Office, or
(ii) Asserting an argument of patentability.
A primafacie case of unpatentability is established when the information compels a conclusion that a claim is unpatentable under
the preponderance of evidence, burden-of-proof standard, giving
each term in the claim its broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification, and before any consideration is given to
evidence which may be submitted
in an attempt to establish a con82
trary conclusion of patentability.
The new PTO materiality standard is prospective only.8 3 The
reasonable examiner standard governs inequitable conduct determinations in patent prosecutions before March 16, 1992,11 and it is not
certain that the courts will adopt the altered PTO Rule 56 standard for
the inequitable conduct defense, which the courts recognized long before the adoption of the Rule 56 duty of candor in 1977.
c.

Claim Amendments-Timing and Manner of
Disclosure

The materiality of a prior art reference and other information
whether the particular examiner of the application at issue considered the reference to be important; rather, it is that of a 'reasonable examiner.' (citation omitted) Nor is a reference immaterial simply because the claims are eventually deemed by an examiner to be patentable

thereover." (citation omitted)).
82. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (1995) (emphasis added).
83. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1179 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
84. Id.
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depends on what the applicant attempts to claim, and amendments
narrowing the scope of claims pending in an application may make
immaterial information that was material to broader claims. The
amendment may result because the examiner independently discovers
the reference.
Federal Circuit decisions express differing opinions on whether

inequitable conduct can arise from an applicant's failure to cite a reference that was material only to claims that were amended or deleted
during prosecution" or when the examiner independently finds a
material reference the applicant failed to cite.86 Also, decisions have
pronounced no general rule about the timing of disclosure 87 but have

found no inequitable conduct in specific situations when an applicant
cited prior art late in a prosecution 88 or failed to cite art that came to
85. Compare Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583
(Fed. Cir. 1991) ("A reference that is material only to withdrawn claims can not be the basis of
a holding of inequitable conduct.") and Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d
1437, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (when a patent is attacked for failure to cite material prior art, a
court assesses inequitable conduct by reference to the patent's claims, not claims that the examiner rejected for reasons other than the uncited prior art and which the applicant cancelled
during prosecution) with Fox Indus. v. Structural Preservation Sys., 922 F.2d 801, 803 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) ("[A] breach of the duty of candor early in the prosecution may render unenforceable all claims which eventually issue from the same or a related application.') and Driscoll v.
Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (failure to cite a known anticipatory prior art reference is inequitable conduct even though: (1) a new attorney for the inventor had amended a
claim to avoid the reference disclosure before the examiner acted on the claim, and (2) the examiner suspended prosecution pending an interference before allowing the claims to which the
withheld reference was material).
86. Compare Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1185, 1189 n.7 (Fed. Cir.
1995) ("'When a reference was before the examiner, whether through the examiner's search or
the applicant's disclosure, it cannot be deemed to have been withheld from the examiner."')
(quoting Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1582 (Fed. Cir
1991)); Nies, J., dissenting: "prior to Scripps, this court concluded that a reference not disclosed to the Examiner but which is later discovered by the Examiner can be deemed to be
withheld from the PTO") and Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d
1565, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991) with A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 798 F.2d 1392, 1399
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (references not cited to an examiner were material when: (1) an application's
claims were allowed, (2) after a delay caused by an interference, the examiner rejected the
claims after independently discovering the references, and (3) the claims were allowed after
amendment).
87. In one decision, the Federal Circuit held that an instance of inequitable conduct during prosecution could be "cured" by a full disclosure. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co.,
722 F.2d 1556, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1983), laterproceeding,736 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
88. Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546,
1553-54 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (the patentee called the examiner's attention to the Hoffar reference
"after allowance of the claims, following which the examiner reopened prosecution."; "There
was evidence that [the inventor's] German patent attorney knew of the Hoffar reference, and
believed that it was merely cumulative to the prior art already before the U.S. examiner; that
the German attorney responded promptly to the request by his U.S. patent attorney for all references cited in other countries; and that after receiving these references, which included
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applicant's attention only shortly before the patent issued. 9
In the 1992 amendment to Rule 56, the PTO expressly stated
that the disclosure duty relates only to pending claims, but this does
not resolve whether there is inequitable conduct when an applicant
knowingly fails to cite a reference that is material to a pending claim
but later amends the claim.9" The PTO also adopted rules on the
timing of disclosures in information disclosure statements. 9t
Questions have arisen whether an applicant violates the duty of
candor by citing (burying) a reference in a long list of other, less
material references. One district court decision found improper
burying.92 Later, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that burying
could occur but reversed a district court finding of burying because
there was no clear evidence of an intent to conceal the reference.93
d. Search Reportsfrom ForeignPatent Offices
A reference cited by a foreign patent office during examination
of a counterpart application is not necessarily material because the
claims may differ and foreign patentability standards are not identical
to those in the United States.94 Nevertheless, such cited references
are likely to be material, and the PTO encourages applicants to scrutinize carefully foreign patent office search reports to determine
whether they contain material prior art that should be cited in the
United States. 95

Hoffar, the U.S. attorney promptly cited Hoffar to the PTO.").
89. Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG v. Hantscho Commercial Prods., Inc., 21 F.3d
1068, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., Inc., 973
F.2d 911, 917-18, 1921 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (a company and its patent attorney did not intend to
deceive the PTO by failing to disclose another patent that apparently claimed the same invention as that claimed in the company's pending application when: (1) the interfering patent issued after the company paid the issue fee on its application, (2) its patent issued six weeks

later, (3) the patent attorney took ten weeks to study the interfering patent and determine
"what the heck to do about it," and (4) the attorney disclosed the interfering patent in an information disclosure statement filed five weeks later in a sibling application).
90. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1995).
91. Id.

92.

Penn Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark Boats, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 948, (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd,

479 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1972).

93. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1183-84 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
94. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting the "risk in relying on foreign patent prosecution in light of differences in disclosure requirements, claim
practice, form of application, and standard of patentability"); Heidelberger Druckmaschinen
AG v. Hantscho Commercial Prods., Inc., 21 F.3d 1068, 1072 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("[lMhe
theories and laws of patentability vary from country to country, as do examination practices.").
95. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a)(1) (1995).

1997]BESTMODECONCEALMENT& INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 299
2. Information Disclosure Statements
An applicant may submit to the PTO an information disclosure
statement (IDS) listing patents, publications, and other information
that may be relevant to patentability." Inclusion of an item in an IDS
is neither an admission that the item is in fact a material prior art reference 97 nor a representation that a search of the prior art has been
made.98 The PTO encourages applicants to use form PTO-1449 to
submit an IDS.
From 1977 to 1992, the PTO's Rule 97 made submission of an
IDS an optional but encouraged means of complying with the duty of
candor. In 1992, the PTO amended Rule 97, making submission of
an IDS necessary "[i]n order to have information considered by the
Office during the pendency of a patent application."' 9
Rule 97 imposes time limits on filing an IDS. 100 An IDS filed
within three months of filing the application or before the first Office
action on the merits is always timely. An IDS filed after the threemonth limit may be timely if a fee or certification is submitted. An
applicant who, for any reason, does not meet the time limits, may
have an item considered by abandoning the application and filing a
continuation application with a timely IDS.
An IDS must list patents, publications, and other information.' 0'
Before the 1992 amendment, Rule 97 required the applicant to concisely explain the relevance of each listed item. The 1992 amendment
made a concise relevance explanation mandatory only for items "not
in the English language."'' 0
3. Persons Subject to Duty-Duty to Search-Foreign
Patent Agents-Attorney Conflicts of Interest
The duty of candor extends to: (1) the inventor or inventors, (2)
the attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the application, and
(3) any individual who is substantively involved in the preparation or
prosecution of the application and who is associated with the inven-

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

37 C.F.R.
37 C.F.R.
37 C.F.R.
37 C.F.R.
Id.

§ 1.97 (1995).
§ 1.97(h) (1995).
§ 1.97(g) (1995).
§ 1.97 (1995).

101. 37 C.F.R. § 1.98(a) (1995). Copies of the cited items should be enclosed. Id. If an
item is in a language other than English, a translation should be provided if one is readily
available to the applicant. 37 C.F.R. § 1.98(c) (1995).
102. 37 C.F.R. § 1.98(a)(3) (1995).
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tor, the assignee, or anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign
the application."°3
The duty of candor requires persons who are substantively involved in a prosecution to disclose only what they know. Court decisions do not impose a duty to conduct a search of the prior art, but
they caution that a person may not cultivate ignorance, that is,
"disregard numerous warnings that material information or prior art
may exist, merely to avoid actual knowledge of that information or
prior art."'"

The duty of candor extends to patent agents or attorneys in other
countries who have primary responsibility for the prosecution of an
application and act through a corresponding U.S. attorney or agent) 5
In the Haritadecision, 6 the Federal Circuit held that the PTO failed
to establish such "intent to mislead" the PTO as to justify rejection of
the patentee's application seeking reissuance of the patent when:
(1) a Japanese patent agent for the inventors, who worked for a
small Japanese company that had little prior patent experience, filed
in Japan an application claiming a group of chemical compounds usefil for treating asthma;
(2) the agent forwarded an English version of the application to
a U.S. patent attorney for filing in the United States PTO;
(3) the U.S. attorney, in recommending that the applicant separately claim the method of using the compounds, advised the agent
that such a method-of-use claim, unlike the compound claim, would
not be invalidated by "prior art teaching a species of the genus of
compounds in question;"
(4) during the prosecution of a corresponding application in
France, a prior art reference disclosing such a species within the
claim in the U.S. application was cited and brought to the attention of
the applicantlinventors;
(5) on advice of the Japanese agent, the applicantinventors
103. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c) (1995). See FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415
n.8. (Fed. Cir. 1987) (in applying the requirement that there be "knowledge chargeable to applicant" of the prior art or information and its materiality, "applicant" "includes the patentee

and the attorney who prosecuted the application that resulted" in the patent-in-suit, because
"the knowledge and actions of applicant's attorney are chargeable to applicant."); Fox Indus. v.

Structural Preservation Sys., 922 F.2d 801, 804 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
104. FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., 836 F.2d 521,526 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
105.

Gemveto Jewelry Co., v. Lambert Bros., 542 F. Supp. 933, 938 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)

(['Jnequitable conduct occurred when an agent in another country withheld material information from the U.S. corresponding attorney and such information was never disclosed to the
PTO examiner). Cf.Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
106. In re Harita, 847 F.2d 801 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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failed to forward the reference to the U.S. attorney for citation to the
U.S. PTO examiner;
(6) in so advising the lack of necessity for citing the reference,
the Japanese patent agent assumed that the practice in Japan, which
imposed no duty of disclosure, applied to the U.S.;
(7) after issuance of the patent on the U.S. application, the Japanese agent became aware of the duty to disclose known material prior
art under U.S. practice;
(8) the agent informed the assignee of the U.S. application that
the newly discovered prior art should have been disclosed to the
PTO; and

(9) the assignee thereafter, "with reasonable promptness" (about
15 months after issuance of the patent), filed an application for reissue to narrow the scope of the claims of the patent. 107
In Harita, the court noted that "an ideal Japanese patent
agent.., should have known more about U.S. PTO rules and practice
and developing case law," but it refused to "infer merely from some
vague thing called 'gross negligence' an intent which it was the
PTO's obligation to establish and especially.., should not infer it in
light of detailed rules of procedure enacted long after the events in
this case took place.' 08
A difficult issue of potential conflict of interest may arise when
a patent attorney represents two unrelated applicants and knows of
information material to one applicant's patent application only because of the other applicant's confidential communications. In Molins, the issue was presented but not decided. 09 The court held that
an attorney did not commit inequitable conduct by failing to disclose
in the prosecution of an application by one client a pending, earlierfiled application of another client. The undisclosed earlier application was not material because it was cumulative to information already before the examiner. The court noted that the situation was:
fraught with possible conflict of interest because [the attorney's]
dual representation of two clients seeking patents in closely related
technologies created a risk of sacrificing the interest of one client

for that of the other and of failing to discharge his duty of candor
to the PTO with respect to each client. Whether or not there was a
conflict of interest, however, is not before us, and we express no
opinion thereon. Nor do we express any opinion regarding the ap107. 847 F.2d at 803-07.
108. Id. at 809.
109. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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parent conflict between an attorney's obligations to the PTO and
the attorney's obligation to clients. "0°
Two judges expressed polar opinions on the issue. Judge Nies
opined that the attorney's "representation of clients with conflicting
interests provides no justification for deceiving the PTO. Ethics required him to withdraw."' Judge Newman opined that the attorney
had "neither authority nor obligation to breach the confidentiality of
that client's pending application, on behalf of a different client." 1 2
4. Consequences of Inequitable Conduct
Breach of the duty of candor constitutes inequitable conduct if
the withheld or misrepresented information was material and the responsible person acted with sufficient culpability.
a. Culpability-Intentto Deceive
Before 1988, some Federal Circuit decisions suggested the culpability element was satisfied by a showing of gross negligence." 3 In
the 1988 in banc Kingsdown decision, the Federal Circuit decreed
that: "a finding that particular conduct amounts to 'gross negligence'
does not of itself justify an inference of intent to deceive; the involved conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence, including evisufficient culpability to
dence indicative of good faith, must indicate
4
require a finding of intent to deceive.""
Federal Circuit decisions since Kingsdown consistently emphasize that the inequitable conduct defense requires that there be a
finding of intent to deceive and that such intent must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence." 5 Some decisions decry the tendency
of accused infringers to rely routinely on the defense, describing it as
a "plague.""' 6 Other decisions, recognizing the negative conseI10. Id.
111. Id.at1190.
atl192.
112. Id.
113. J.P. Stevens & Co. v.Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560 (Fed.Cir. 1984); American
Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
114. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir.

1988).
115. E.g., Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
("Intent to deceive should be determined in light of the realities of patent practice, and not as a
matter of strict liability whatever the nature of the action before the PTO ....Given the ease
with which a relatively routine act of patent prosecution can be portrayed as intended to mislead or deceive, clear and convincing evidence of conduct sufficient to support an inference of
culpable intent is required.').
116. Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988):
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quences of the defense on professional reputations, reiterate the imof maintaining the integrity of the patent procurement procportance
117
ess.
Intent to deceive need not be proved by direct evidence but
rather may be inferred from circumstantial evidence." 8 For example,

in one decision, the court held that "[flailure to cite to the PTO a
material reference cited elsewhere in the world justifies a strong in-

ference that the withholding was intentional."' '
There can be no intent to deceive in withholding information
[Ihe habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case
has become an absolute plague. Reputable lawyers seem to feel compelled to
make the charge against other reputable lawyers on the slenderest grounds, to
represent their client's interests adequately, .perhaps. They get anywhere with
the accusation in but a small percentage of the cases, but such charges are not
inconsequential on that account. They destroy the respect for one another's integrity.
117. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1995):
One who has engaged in inequitable conduct has inflicted damage on the patent
examining system, obtaining a statutory period of exclusivity by improper
means, and on the public, which must face an unlawfully-granted patent. Loss
of one's patent and damage to reputation are justified penalties for such conduct. On the other hand, unjustified accusations of inequitable conduct are offensive and unprofessional. They have been called a "plague" on the patent
system. Unjustified accusations may deprive patentees of their earned property
rights and impugn fellow professionals. They should be condemned.
(citation ommitted).
118. See, e.g., Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1189-90
(Fed. Cir. 1993) ("'[S]moking gun' evidence is not required in order to establish an intent to
deceive."); LaBounty Mfg. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1076 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (quoting FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411 (1987)):
Direct proof of wrongful intent is rarely available but may be inferred from clear
and convincing evidence of the surrounding circumstances.
No single factor or combination of factors can be said always to requirean inference of
intent to mislead; yet a patentee facing a high level of materiality and clear proof that it
knew or should have known of that materiality, can expect to find it difficult to establish "subjective good faith" sufficient to prevent the drawing of an inference of intent to
mislead. A mere denial of intent to mislead (which would defeat every effort to establish inequitable conduct) will not suffice in such circumstances.
Merck & Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 873 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Intent need
not, and rarely can, be proven by direct evidence.").
119. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1995):
[The alleged conduct must not amount merely to the improper performance of,
or omission of, an act one ought to have performed. Rather, clear and convincing evidence must prove that an applicant had the specific intent to accomplish
an act that the applicant ought not to have performed, viz., misleading or deceiving the PTO. In a case involving nondisclosure of information, clear and
convincing evidence must show that the applicant made a deliberate decision to
withhold a known material reference.
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when the person has no knowledge of the information. 2 0
b. Examination-Continuationand Reissue
Applications--Cure-Inteferences
In 1988, after the Harita decision, the PTO announced that it
was ending its practice of investigating and rejecting applications for
noncompliance with the duty of candor. 21 It indicated that it was not
a suitable forum for determining questions of intent to deceive, which
Harita made necessary. Questions of compliance with the duty
would be determined by the courts following a challenge to a patent's
enforceability because of alleged inequitable conduct.

A patent issuing on a continuation or reissue application may be
unenforceable if inequitable conduct occurred in connection with the
original or parent application.'2 In Rohm & Haas,"' the Federal Circuit held that an instance of inequitable conduct (submission of misleading data) could be cured later in the prosecution of an application
if the applicant makes a corrective disclosure. 24 This privilege to
cure may extend to a cure in a continuation application, but decisions
suggest that, once a patent issues, a reissue application cannot be
used to cure inequitable conduct. 2
See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987):
[O]ne who alleges a "failure to disclose" form of inequitable conduct must offer
clear and convincing proof of: (1) prior art or information that is material; (2)
knowledge chargeable to applicant of that prior art or information and of its
materiality; and (3) failure of the applicant to disclose the art or information resulting from an intent to mislead the PTO. That proof may be rebutted by a
showing that. (a) the prior art or information was not material (e.g., because it is
less pertinent than or merely cumulative with prior art or information cited to or
by the PTO); (b) if the prior art or information was material, a showing that the
applicant did not know of that art or information; (c) if applicant did know of
that art or information, a showing that applicant did not know of its materiality;
(d) a showing that applicant's failure to disclose art or information did not result
from an intent to mislead the PTO.
121. Implementation of 37 C.F.R. §1.56, 1095 OFF. GAz. PAT. OFFICE 16 (Oct. I1, 1988).
122. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 882 F.2d 1556, 1563-64 n.7 (Fed,
Cir. 1989); on remand to 746 F. Supp. 1413 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd 925 F.2d 1480 (Fed. Cir,
1991), Digital Equip. Corp. v. Diamond, 653 F.2d 701,710 (Ist Cir. 1981).
123. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1983), laterpro.
ceeding, 736 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
124. Id. at 1571-72.
125. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 882 F.2d 1556, 1564 nA (Fed. Cir.
1989), on remand to 746 F.Supp. 1413 (N.D. Cal. 1990), affd, 925 F.2d 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1991):
It is well settled that, in the... case of inequitable conduct during prosecution
of the original application, reissue is not available to obtain new claims and
thereby rehabilitate the patent. See, e.g., In re Clark, 522 F.2d 623,
627... (reissue unavailable to rescue patentee who committed inequitable con120.
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Inequitable conduct is a basis for awarding priority against a
party to an interference (whether against an applicant or a patentee). 126 In 1991, the PTO confirmed that inequitable conduct issues
could be raised in interferences even though the PTO had ceased in-

equitable conduct investigations in ex parte prosecutions. 127
c.

Unenforceability--All Claims Rule--Attorney

Fees
If the inequitable conduct is discovered after a patent issues, the
patent will be unenforceable even if it is otherwise valid and infringed. Courts apply a two-step approach in adjudicating an inequi-

table defense: first, the court must find the threshold facts of materiality and intent to deceive; second, if the thresholds are met, the court
weighs the degree of materiality and intent "to determine whether the
equities warrant a conclusion that inequitable conduct occurred."' 12

If inequitable conduct occurs in prosecution of a patent application, all the patent's claims are unenforceable, even claims dealing
with subject matter not related to the misconduct.129 In the 1988 in

banc Kingsdown decision, the Federal Circuit confirmed the all
claims rule: "When a court has finally determined that inequitable
conduct occurred in relation to one or more claims during prosecution of the patent application, the entire patent is rendered unenforce3

able. ' 1 30 Unenforceability may extend to other related patents.1 '

An accused infringer who succeeds in establishing that the pat-

ent was procured through inequitable conduct may be awarded attorand
ney fees,132 but such award is discretionary with the trial judge
3
finding.
conduct
inequitable
an
follow
does not necessarily
duct during original prosecution).
But cf Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1183-84 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Harita, 847
F.2d 801, 808-809 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
126. Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Langer v. Kaufman, 465 F.2d
915,921 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
127. 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2023 (1992). See Gustavsson v. Valentini, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1401,
1407-08 (1991).
128. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
129. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
130. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
131. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Consolidated
Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l. Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
132. Fox Indus., Inc. v. Structural Preservation Sys., Inc., 922 F.2d 801, 804 (Fed. Cir.
1990); Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 407 F.2d 288,
298 (9th Cir. 1969).
133. Gardco Mfg., Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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d. Walker Process
A person injured by willfully committed inequitable conduct involving highly material information that results in an improper moeinopoly in a defined relevant market may sue for damages under
34
laws.
competition
unfair
state
or
laws
antitrust
federal
ther the
B. Recent Case Examples
Four 1996 Federal Circuit decisions address inequitable conduct
defenses. Only one upheld the defense, relying in part on a conflict
between the testimony of the inventor and his patent attorney as to
their communications, a sobering reminder of the strains on professional relationships that the inequitable conduct defense engender. t35
Another decision "jaw-boned" a corporate patent owner for questionable patent prosecution practice.' 36 Perhaps the most significant deci37 which found no
sion in terms of precedential value is Nordberg,1
inequitable conduct in failure to disclose a prior art reference patent
that rendered a patent in suit invalid when the corporate assignee of
the patent in suit owned the reference patent but the individuals responsible for prosecuting the patent had no personal knowledge of
38
the patent.
In Refac International,Ltd. v. Lotus Development Corp.139 the
Federal Circuit held that the district court did not err in finding ineq-

134. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175-76
(1965); Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 166-67

(Fed. Cir. 1985); American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1366
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
Willful inequitable conduct in procurement of a patent may also violate Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988); American Cyanamid
Co. v. F.T.C., 363 F.2d 757, 769 (6th Cir. 1966).

Even without inequitable conduct, filing, or threatening to file, a patent infringement suit
in bad faith and without a genuine belief in the possibility of success may violate the antitrust
laws. Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1984). A bad faith
enforcement claim cannot be pursued unless the patentee's action was "objectively baseless";

only if the action was objectively baseless can the court examine the patentee's subjective motivation in bringing the suit (e.g., to drive out a competitor). Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro
Mechanical Sys., Inc., 3 F.3d 404, 413 (Fed. Cir. 1993), replaced by 15 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir,

1993). See also Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508
U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993).

135.

Refac Int'l., Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

136.

B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys. Corp., 72 F.3d 1577, 1585 (Fed. Cir.

1996).
137. Nordberg, Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 82 F.3d 394 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

138. Id. at 397.
139. Refac Int'l., Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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uitable conduct based on the patentee's submission of opinion affidavits on the patent specification's disclosure sufficiency without disclosing one affiant's prior association with the inventor and familiarity with the commercial embodiment of the invention.
The patent concerned a program for converting software source
code to object code. The PTO examiner rejected the claims for inadequate enabling disclosure. A co-inventor (Pardo) submitted an
affidavit stating that the patent specification was sufficient to enable
a person skilled in programming to make and use the claimed invention. Unpersuaded, the examiner made the rejection final, noting that
the inventor's affidavit was "self serving and therefore has very little
probative value." 4 '

The inventors (Pardo and Landau) and their attorney adopted the
strategy of "filing affidavits from three people other than the inventors, with different experience and skill levels, attesting to the sufficiency of the disclosure."14' They filed the three affidavits with an
amendment stating that "'the present invention is directed to the
computer scientist or compiler writer, not a mere programmer, and it
is such compiler writer who is the man of "ordinary skill in the art"
who would practice the invention as defined by the claims.""' 42 After
the affidavits were filed, the examiner withdrew the insufficient disclosure rejection.
The inventors and their attorneys did not disclose to the PTO
that "each of the affiants had a prior association with the inventors'
company, Lanpar, Ltd., or that they had pre-existing knowledge of a
commercial embodiment of the invention, the LANPAR program." 143
The district court found that there was insufficient proof of inequitable conduct in the disclosure omission for two of the affiants,'" but
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 1578.
Id.
Id.

143. Id. at 1579.
144. The two affidavits were by Bullen and Cikra. Refac, 81 F.3d at 1578.
Bullen, a supervisor of programmers, "stated that an average programmer could have

written a computer program from the application's disclosure using programming techniques
known before the application was filed." Id. "[W:hen Bullen was a consultant with UNIVAC
Canada, he had worked with Landau, who was at the time a programmer employed by Bell
Canada ....[The inventors] Pardo and Landau had informed Bullen, before he executed his

affidavit, that a computer program implementing the invention was in use at Bell Canada." Id.
at 1579. The district court held that submission of this affidavit was not inequitable conduct
because the inventors "had not understood that the need for an affidavit from a disinterested
person might have precluded use of Bullen as an affiant, or that knowledge of Bullen's contact
with Bell Canada and its relationship with Lanpar was material to consideration of the disclosures by the PTO." Id.
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the fourth affiant, Jones, "was a different matter."'45 Jones, a computer scientist and compiler writer, stated: "[F]rom the written disclosures and flow chart shown in the drawing of such patent application, [I] could have produced as of August 12, 1970, and prior
thereto, and using only programming techniques known on or prior to
August 12, 1970, the necessary coding and could have written a detailed computer program therefrom.""' Jones worked for the inventors' company Lanpar for not more than eight weeks, less than six
months before executing his affidavit. He learned internal details of
the LANPAR Program, observed it in operation, and drafted an introduction for its manual. The district court found that "the information
omitted from Jones's affidavit was material to the examiner's
evaluation of the affidavit and that the inventors submitted the affidavit with an intent to mislead the PTO.""' 7 The inventors Landau
and Pardo "had an opportunity to review Jones's affidavit, as they
were sent copies of a draft and the final affidavit after it was executed."" 48 The inventor Pardo "was actively involved in providing
the attorney with background information regarding the three affiants, particularly Jones."' 49 "'Jones's extensive experience with and
knowledge of the LANPAR Program contradicted the very essence of
the disinterested affidavit' ....10 Because "the examiner did not

withdraw the rejection in response to [inventor] Pardo's affidavit, the
inventors knew that Jones's connection with the invention would

Cikra, a computer programmer, "stated that he had actually written a computer program
solely from the disclosure and had sufficiently tested the program to verify its operability." Id.
at 1578. "Cikra had worked with the inventors to enable a version of the LANPAR program to
operate with another software system, reviewed portions of the LANPAR program source code,

and observed the program being used." Id. at 1579. The district court held that submission of
this affidavit posed a "closer question" but was not inequitable conduct because

Cikra had had limited contact with the program and... while prudence would
have dictated disclosing Cikra's contact with the invention, the inventors appar-

ently did not know, given their lack of familiarity with patent prosecution, that
Cikra's involvement should have been disclosed to the PTO. The district court

also found that Cikra's affidavit failed to mention that he had taken a compiler
course in college and had sorting program experience, but that there was no reason for the inventors or their attorney to have believed that such information
was relevant to evaluation of his affidavit.

Id.
145. Id. at 1580.
146. Id. at 1579.
147. Id. at 1580.
148.

Id.

149.

Refac Int'l., Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

150. Id.

1997]BESTMODECONCEALAE

& INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 309

have been material .... 15' The omissions in the Bullen and Cikra
affidavits heightened the effect of the Jones affidavit's fraudulent
omission.
The Federal Circuit affirmed. First, the district court did not
clearly err in finding that the omitted prior association was material.
"We cannot hold as a matter of law that omission of a relevant part of
one's employment history on an affidavit intended to show the adequacy of the patent specification to one of ordinary skill in the art,
when such an affidavit by the inventor was earlier rejected, does not
constitute inequitable conduct." 152 Jones had worked at the inventor's company less than six months before he executed his affidavit,
which recited his employment history in detail. He reviewed documentation for the commercial embodiment of the invention. When
he reviewed the application's disclosure, he recognized the flow chart
as the same one the iiventor had shown him in a training session.
The affiant's "own testimony thus indicated that he possessed
pre-existing knowledge of the invention when he prepared his affidavit. It would surely have been important for the examiner, and any
reasonable examiner, to know of [his] association with [the invenknowledge of the [invention's
tor's company] and his pre-existing
1 53
commercial embodiment].
The patentee's argument that the Jones affidavit was cumulative
to the other two and therefore was not material under Federal Circuit
case law is not persuasive:
We decline to place submitted cumulative affidavits in the same
status as unsubmitted cumulative prior art. While it is not necessary to cite cumulative prior art because it adds nothing to what is
already of record (although it may be prudent to do so), one cannot
excuse the submission of a misleading affidavit on the ground that
it was only cumulative. Affidavits are inherently material, even if
only cumulative. The affirmative act of submitting an affidavit
must be construed as being intended to be relied upon. It is not
comparable to omitting an unnecessary act.
Whether or not Jones's affidavit was cumulative to that of Cikra's
and Bullen's affidavits is ... of no consequence. Since any one of
the affidavits from Cikra, Bullen, and Jones may have resulted in
an allowance of the claims, each affidavit ipso facto had a certain
level of materiality.... Since the examiner did not allow the
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1585.
153. Id. at 1581.
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claims in response to the inventor's own affidavit, the inventors
were on notice that the examiner would consider it important to
know of the affiants' pre-existing knowledge of the invention or
his connection with the inventors. An inventor cannot submit a
misleading affidavit among a plurality of affidavits and later argue
that it was the nonmisleading affidavit that resulted in allowance,
thus effectively curing the defective affidavit.'54
The patentee's argument that the misleading affidavit offered
mere opinion, which, under PTO guidelines, had no probative value,
an intent to mislead," 155
and, therefore, "cannot be used to infer
156
"qualifies only for a chutzpah award":
An affidavit submitted to overcome a rejection is intended to be
relied upon .... The inventors submitted the Jones affidavit to the
PTO in an attempt to overcome a rejection. It was incumbent upon
them to provide the PTO with sufficient information for a reasonable examiner to consider the opinion in the affidavit in context,
not with a selective and misleading disclosure. The inventors
failed to do that and cannot post facto hide behind the MPEP
guidelines to15 7argue that what they did with a purpose should be
disregarded.
Second, the district court did not err in inferring an intent to deceive:
The inventors had an opportunity to review Jones's affidavit before it was submitted to the PTO. Given what the examiner characterized as the self-serving nature of Pardo's affidavit, they were
on notice from the PTO that affidavits from disinterested persons
were needed in order to overcome the substantive ground of the
rejection. The inventors should therefore have known that the fact
of an affiant's prior knowledge of the invention would have been
important to the examiner in deciding whether to withdraw the rejection and allow the application, particularly when the examiner
had no way of otherwise obtaining the omitted information about
Jones's background. See Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM
Lab., Inc. .... "The inference [of an intent to mislead] arises not
simply from the materiality of the affidavits, but from the affirmaand the
tive acts of submitting them, their misleading character,
58
inabilityofthe examiner to investigate the facts.'

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Refac Int'l., Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1584.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1581-82 (citations omitted).
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The appeals court noted that "determining whether there was an
intent to mislead the PTO involved credibility determinations,"'159 referring to a conflict in the testimony between the inventors and their
patent attorney. The inventors' attorney testified that: (1) he inquired
into, but was not told by the inventors of, the affiant's prior association with the inventors and knowledge of the invention, and (2) "if he
had had this knowledge, he would have either disclosed such information to the PTO or not used [the] affiant."'16 One inventor testified
that "his attorney knew that [the affiant] had worked at [the inventors' company]." 6 ' Because, as the district court found, the inventors
did not inform their patent attorney of the affiants' association with
their company and knowledge of the commercial embodiment after
he had inquired into the affiants' prior associations, the district court
could conclude that "withholding such information from their attorney and effectively from the PTO was intentional."1 62
In Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 63 the Federal Circuit
reached a conclusion about an expert declaration that contrasts with
that in Refac. Litton's patent claimed a method for making nearly
perfect mirrors for ring-laser gyroscopes for aircraft navigation systems. The method entailed bombarding targets with a "Kaufmantype ion beam source" in a controlled atmosphere vacuum chamber
to deposit on a rotating substrate multiple layers, the alternating layers having different indices of refraction.
In 1978, Litton submitted its original application to the PTO.
During prosecution of the application, Litton cited no prior art. The
patent ('958) issued on March 6, 1979. On July 2, 1985, while litigating with another party over RLG mirrors, Litton sought to reissue
the '958 patent. Their reissue application incorporated dependent
claim 2 into independent claim 1, thereby narrowing its scope. On
August 30, 1985, Litton submitted a patentability report citing
eighty-two prior art references to the examiner. 164 During prosecution of the reissue application, the patentee Litton submitted an affidavit by one Baumeister to overcome the PTO examiner's rejection,
which cited prior art disclosing, inter alia, use of a duoplasmatron for
making ion beam depositions. After the submission, the examiner

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Refac Int'l., Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 87 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

164. Id. at 1565.
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allowed the claims, and the PTO reissued the patent on January 31,
1989 (reissue '849).
The district court found inequitable conduct in Litton's failure to
disclose certain references and in its submission of Baumeister's
declaration. It determined that Baumeister's declaration deliberately
misled the examiner by omitting his lack of experience with the
claimed technology.
Baumeister's declaration did not present any new facts or arguments to distinguish the invention from the prior art, but rather
provided the examiner with the testimony of a man who was represented to be a person of great skill in the pertinent art. Baumeister's testimony
at trial proved beyond question that he was not
65
such a person.
The Federal Circuit reversed. First, the trial court166"both overestimated and misconstrued the Baumeister declaration":
The Baumeister declaration was only one of four different declarations on which the examiner based allowance of the '849 reissue
claims. Furthermore, the declaration does not misstate Mr.
Baumeister's qualifications. He is an academic whose specialty is
optical coatings. He led a university research team to obtain mirrors having the highest possible reflectivity. He did not purport to
have expertise in ion-beam deposition. In sum, Baumeister professed no more than his actual qualifications. He did not ever profess experience with a duoplasmatron or ion-beam. Despite the
could not have attributed
trial court's insinuation, the examiner
67
false qualifications to Baumeister.1
Second, the district court's finding that the patentee intentionally withheld a prior art reference (Laznovsky):
cannot support inequitable conduct because the examiner received
and considered Laznovsky during reissue. An applicant cannot
intentionally withhold a reference actually considered by the PTO,
even though the applicant may not have disclosed the art. Thus,
the applicant did not
because Laznovsky was before the examiner,
8
intentionally withhold the reference.16
In B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Systems Corp.169 the

165.
166.
167.
168.
omitted).
169.

Id. at 1570.
Id. at 1571.
Id.
Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 87 F.3d 1559, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996)(citations
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys. Corp., 72 F.3d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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Federal Circuit affirmed a district court's no-equitable conduct finding even though the patentee failed to disclose to the PTO a prior art
reference and its own "public use," each of which rendered the patent
invalid. The patents claimed an aircraft landing gear disk brake assembly and a method of overhauling a disk brake assembly. The
district court held the patents' claims invalid for obviousness because
the difference between a prior art reference, the "Dunlop" paper,
which was not before the PTO during examination, and the claimed
invention was "relatively minor"'170 and the reference provided the
suggestion to make the invention.
The district court found no inequitable conduct though it was
"troubled" by the patentee's conduct, including: (1) the failure to disclose potential on-sale bars in the form of sales demonstrations to
potential customers more than a year before the patentee filed its application, (2) the failure to disclose the Dunlop paper even though it
was in the files of several employees of the patentee, and (3) the
submission of a "state of the art" declaration by the patentee's director of engineering, which stated that he (the director) had read the literature and attended trade shows and seminars and had never seen a
suggestion for a construction such as that claimed.
The Federal Circuit affirmed, echoing the district court's concern about the patentee's conduct but giving it "the benefit of the
doubt because determinations of obviousness and the applicability of
the on-sale bar are often close and subject to varying reasonable interpretations."'' First,
[tlhere was a basis for the patent attorney prosecuting the applications to conclude that [the patentee's) meeting with [one customer]
did not trigger the on-sale bar on the ground that it was a technical,
not a sales, meeting, and thus that it need not have been disclosed
to the PTO. Prudence would have dictated otherwise, but the requisite evidence of intent to deceive is lacking. [Also], activity
[with a foreign manufacturer, which had U.S. customers,] seemingly occurred outside the United States, and its nondisclosure
does not reveal an intent to deceive. 72
Second, the evidence showed that the inventor and his attorney
did not become aware of the Dunlop paper until after the patent issued. Finally, the "state of the art" declaration, though "more troubling," fell "short of providing an inference of an intent to mislead
170. Id. at 1583.
171. Id. at 1584.
172. Id. at 1584-85.
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the PTO."'73
While the statements in the affidavit are true, as [the patentee] asserts, this alone does not negate a finding of inequitable conduct,
since truthful statements can be crafted in a misleading manner
through intentional omission of particular relevant facts. However, there is no evidence of intentional omission of relevant facts
in the affidavit and, in particular, no evidence that [the director] in
fact knew of [the] Dunlop [reference].
In a deposition, the director testified that "he did not recall seeing the copy of [the reference] on which his name was handwritten as
part of a circulation list."' 75
The Federal Circuit ended with a rebuke:
Our conclusion does not mean, however, that we condone [the patentee's] conduct in prosecuting the... patents. Barely dodging a
bullet based on our deference to a trial court's decision on the
factual question of intent and on a matter of equity does not merit
approval or justify complacency. [The patentee's] conduct shows
a pattern of careless patent prosecution. It has led to the grant of a
patent which is invalid over a withheld reference. While we have
not reviewed the holding of invalidity based upon the on-sale bar,
there certainly was a close question concerning that uncited event.
The [director's] affidavit evidences questionable conduct, considering that [his] name was on a circulation list for [the reference]
and that he stated in his affidavit that he was responsible for
knowing the literature on aircraft brakes and that he had never
seen a brake assembly as described and shown in the.., patents.
Submission of careless statements under oath deserves criticism ....176

the facts were similar to
In Nordberg, Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 177
those in B.F. Goodrich. The patent concerned a gyratory rock
crusher. The district court held that the patent was invalid based on:
(1) the patentee Nordberg's public use of the claimed invention at a
quarry owned and operated by another party (Tanner) more than one
year before the filing date of the patent application, and (2) obviousness over the prior art, including the patentee's own prior Saunders
patent. But the district court found no inequitable conduct in the pat173.
174.
1996).
175.
176.
177.

Id.at 1585.
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys. Corp., 72 F.3d 1577, 1585 (Fed. Cir.
Id.
Id.
Nordberg, Inc. v. Telsnith, Inc., 82 F.3d 394 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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entee's failure to disclose the Saunders patent or the public use bar.
The patentee's "employees who were under a duty of disclosure, including those who prosecuted the [patent in suit] were unaware of the
78
existence of the [prior art] Saunders patent during prosecution."'
The "relevant" employees of the patentee did not conceal the
Tanner use from the PTO with the intent to mislead even though an
internal memorandum of the patentee stated:
Since the machine has been put in the field, even though a confidentiality exists between ourselves and Tanner, it could be construed because of the relatively open location near the airport and
the free visiting by various dealer personnel that the machine may
not be patentable in the absolute novelty countries because of disclosure. This may be a negative factor in the potential and value
for licensing the machine to our present licensees or for providing
initial advantage to the marketing efforts of our overseas locations
once the machine becomes a product.179
The Federal Circuit affirmed. First, as to the failure to disclose
the on-sale bar, the memorandum stating that the use "might pose
patentability problems 'in absolute novelty' countries"' 80 did not
compel the inference that the patentee knew that the public use was
material prior art. Because the memorandum referred to a confidentiality agreement between the patentee and Tanner, "it supports,
rather than undermines, the district court's finding that the relevant
Nordberg employees believed in good faith that the Tanner use occurred under a confidentiality agreement and therefore was not material prior art. Furthermore, since the United States is not an 'absolute
novelty' country, the statement that the invention 'may not be patentable in the absolute novelty countries' is not necessarily inconsistent
with, let alone sufficient to establish clear error in, the court's finding
that [the patentee] believed that the Tanner use was not material prior
art.92181

Second, as to the failure to disclose the patentee's own prior art
reference patent ("Saunders"), there could be no intent to deceive as
to the undisclosed patent because the persons responsible for the patent prosecution did not actually know of the reference patent.
Although a copy of the Saunders patent was in [the patentee's]
files, the files contained several hundred patents and there was no
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 396.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 396.
Id.at 398.
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showing that any [patentee] employee actually searched the files
and found a copy of the Saunders patent during the pendency of
the... application [for the patent in suit]. Moreover, the unrebutted testimony of [the patentee's] in-house patent counsel indicated
only rethat regular searching of in-house prior art files began
2
cently, after the prosecution of the... patent[-in-suit].,1
The appellants, citing to Molins PLC and FMC Corp, sought:
to overcome the fatal lack of evidence that the relevant [patentee]
employees knew of the Saunders patent's existence by contending
that "Federal Circuit precedent does not require proof of actual
knowledge of the withheld prior art, but only ...proof that the applicant or its 83representatives 'should have known of the art or information."1
The court rejected this argument:
We long ago rejected this contention, American Hoist & Derrick
Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362, 220 USPQ 763,
772 (Fed. Cir.) ("Nor does an applicant for patent, who has no
duty to conduct a prior art search, have an obligation to disclose
any art of which, in the [district] court's words, he 'reasonably
should be aware.")... and neither FMC Corp. nor Molins PLC
held to the contrary. Indeed, our decision in FMC... is directly to
the contrary. There was no dispute in that case that the patentee
knew of the undisclosed information's existence; only knowledge
of the information's materiality was in dispute .... After noting
that proof that the applicant knew of a reference's materiality
"may be rebutted by a showing that... [the] applicant did not
know of that art or information," we discussed the "should have
known" standard in connection with the reference's materiality:
Applicant must be chargeable with knowledge of the existence of the prior art or information, for it is impossible to
disclose the unknown. Similarly, an applicant must be
chargeable with knowledge of the materiality of the art or information; yet an applicant who knew of the art or information cannot intentionally avoid learning of its materiality
through gross negligence, i.e., it may be found that the applicant "should have known" of that materiality.
Similarly, in Molins PLC,we simply observed that "[o]ne who alleges inequitable conduct arising from a failure to disclose prior art
must offer clear and convincing proof of," inter alia, "knowledge

182.
183.

Nordberg, Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 82 F.3d 394,397 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Id.
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chargeable to the applicant of that prior art." It was undisputed
that the applicant in Molins
PLC knew of the existence of the un1
disclosed references. 84
After reading cases such as Nordberg and B.F. Goodrich, a
cynical observer might conclude that patent law encourages ignorance and sloth. Inventors and companies and their patent attorneys
who do not keep abreast of the state of the art and conduct no prior
art searches are less likely to be credibly charged with inequitable
conduct because they have no duty to disclose that which they do not
know. Of course, this may make it more difficult to obtain valid patents and avoid infringement. But the cynic might suggest that companies can have their cake and eat it too by carefully segmenting their
patent operations, having some employees keep abreast of the state of
the art but screening them off from the inventors and attorneys who
are substantively involved in prosecuting applications.18 There is indeed an odd tension in the law of inequitable conduct, which on the
one hand emphasizes a duty of candor and full disclosure of material
information but on the other hand recognizes no duty to search, apparently not even to search one's own patent portfolio, to discover
easily accessible material information.
IV. CONCLUSION: SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM

Reviewing the intricacies of the law on best mode concealment
and the duty of candor in patent procurement (inequitable conduct)
and case examples of the application of these doctrines leads one to
conclude that these requirements have strong positive and negative
effects on the patent system. These effects are similar to those encountered in other areas of legal regulation of commercial conduct,
such as product design and liability, and securities regulation. The
positive effect is that the severe sanction for violating the best mode
and duty of candor requirements, nullification of patent rights, inevitably creates substantial incentives for those seeking patents to do so
with care to comply with full disclosure requirements, thus furthering
the policy objectives of those requirements. Yet, because the sanction benefits private commercial interests, it tends to be asserted excessively, increasing uncertainty and cost in patent enforcement, thus
retarding the overall policies supporting the patent system, which include providing incentives for research and development and the dis184. Id. (citations omitted)
185. The recent Glaxo decision suggests that such a strategy may also be effective in
avoiding the best mode disclosure requirement. See text accompanying supra note 69.
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closure of new technology.
One is tempted to suggest that the best mode and inequitable
conduct concepts should be completely reviewed and revised, but experience over the past few years has shown that substantial reform of
any significant feature of U.S. patent law is politically difficult.
Also, major changes in these requirements should probably be a part
of a more comprehensive revision of the U.S. patent law, one on the
scale of the 1976 Copyright Revision Act.
But there may be modest, noncontroversial procedural reforms
of the "truth in patents" doctrines, especially the best mode requirement, that would preserve their policy substance but decrease the
costs and uncertainty that they impose on the processes of patent procurement and enforcement. As just one example, the timing requirement for best mode compliance would seem to be needless and
deleteriously rigid. Filing a patent application to obtain a "filing
date" is a basic and critical feature of the United States and international patent system. But there seems to be no good reason why the
best mode disclosure requirement, which by definition goes beyond a
description of the invention and a "enabling" disclosure of how to
make and use it, must be measured as of, and be complied with on,
the filing date. This is especially the case with the large category of
"inventions" that are not discrete events, singular flashes of creativity, but rather an organic set of ideas, growing and changing over
time. To pinpoint one day, as the sole measure for best mode compliance, is truly arbitrary. The public policy benefit from best mode
disclosure comes when the United States patent issues (or, as is
common, a corresponding foreign application with the same disclosure is made available eighteen months after filing under patent procedures in Europe, Japan, and other countries.) To require full best
mode disclosure in the application submitted on the original filing
date necessarily must cause delays in filing with potential loss of priority rights, especially outside the United States, where a "first-tofile" priority rule prevails.' The United States missed the opportunity to soften the best mode requirement's timing rigidity when it introduced the "provisional application" procedure in 1996.117 Various
flexible alternatives for allowing a post-filing addition of a "best

186. The priority rules on patent rights create ample incentives for inventors to disclose
valuable "best modes," even if there were no best mode requirement. A danger in omitting any
mode that has commercial value is that someone else will later file an application and obtain a
patent claiming it.
187. See 3 DONALD S.CHISUM, PATENTS § 11.02[l][g] (1996).
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mode" requirement are possible. The object should be a procedure
for inventors and companies that is easier and less error-prone than
the current rule but retains the substance of the disclosure obligation.
For example, if the contemplated best mode has changed over time,
the inventor could be allowed to choose any best mode, either that on
the original filing date, as under current law, or at a later point in
time, perhaps up to a year after the original filing date. The mode
could be added by a continuation-in-part application filed at any
time.1t 8 Disclosing later modes could only benefit the public disclosure policy because later developed modes are typically more sophisticated and developed than earlier ones.189 Because the decision
on best mode is made later in time, when the commercial value of the
invention may be clearer and the applicant may have a better estimate
of the breadth of the claims the patent examiner will allow, the applicant could make a better informed decision about whether obtaining
the patent is worth the pain of disclosing potential trade secrets. If
the invention has become embedded in publicly-accessible commercial processes and products, the inventor could simply adopt those.
Other procedures may be equal or superior in allowing inventors to
avoid inadvertent best mode violations and to create a clear public
record that will forestall validity challenges by accused infringers.

188.

See 3 DoNALD S.CHisum, PATETS § 13.04[2] (1996).

189. An argument that a procedure for adding a best mode disclosure later might induce
some inventors to deliberately withhold the best mode if the original filing misses the point.
Deliberate "concealment" at the initial procedural stage would be perfectly proper. If the inventor-applicant later decides not to add a best mode disclosure, that will create a potential best
mode violation, which would be as easy or easier to detect in litigation than violations under
the current filing-date only rule.

